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The Federal Reserve is more than the U.S. central bank; it is also a kind of
financial State Department, playing a key role in the nation’s foreign affairs.
This is not new: the Fed has functioned as a kind of diplomatic corps since its
founding in 1913.
Throughout this history, it has forged relationships,
traditions, legal commitments, and even built formal
organizational institutions with counterparties abroad.
While important to the Fed’s identity, these connections are also not unique in government. Most independent regulatory agencies engage in some kind of
international diplomacy, separate from the U.S. State
Department.1 We call this practice of pursuing foreign
affairs outside the usual channels of Congress and the
State Department “regulatory diplomacy.”2
Pursuing policy of any kind—social or economic,
foreign or domestic—outside the direct control of
the people’s representatives in the White House and
Congress strikes some as evidence of a “deep state”
bent on undermining popular will.3 We disagree, and
see the complexity of our nation’s institutions not as
an invitation for conspiracy theorists but an invitation
to reflect on the appropriate balance between technocratic policymaking and democratic accountability. In
this Issue Brief, we focus solely on the Federal Reserve,
with its extraordinary power to disrupt foreign economies, respond to cross-border financial contagion, and
favor or disfavor allies with financial interventions in

SUMMARY
• Throughout its history, the U.S. Federal Reserve has engaged in
international diplomacy, outside the bounds of (and sometimes
in conflict with) the priorities of the White House and U.S. State
Department.
• In directing monetary policy, the Fed’s primary concern is to benefit
the U.S. economy. In the process, the Fed at times acts in concert
with foreign central banks, as was the case in setting new bank
regulations after the 2008 financial crisis. At other times, the Fed acts
in ways that other countries view as detrimental to their economic
interests. Either way, the Fed operates with little public accountability, and can wind up complicating the work of U.S. diplomats.
• This issue brief focuses on the questions of whether and how
greater oversight of the Fed’s international activities should be
pursued. It recommends not an overhaul of the Fed’s structure or
the elimination of its role in international affairs, but instead calls
for greater disclosure of its international activities.
• The Fed should provide testimony to Congress twice per year on
its foreign policies, just as it does for monetary and regulatory
policy. This kind of disclosure permits broader discussion of the
Fed’s activities without eliminating the benefits of its institutional
independence for monetary policy.
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their countries. If these functions were
placed inside an institution with more
direct public accountability—such as
the State Department—there would
be less cause for concern. But the idea
that the Fed might have an independent diplomatic policy poses a threat
to “the traditionally executive role in
foreign policy,” given the Fed’s unique
independence as a government agency.
The Fed has longer traditions of independence, controls its own funding
to an extent unmatched elsewhere in
the administrative state, and is almost
completely sealed off from judicial
review.4,5,6 These institutional barriers against oversight by the executive, Congress, and the judiciary give
added urgency to the need for more
oversight over the Fed’s “regulatory
diplomacy.”
Such oversight, however, can
go too far. It may be impossible to
demand central bank subservience in
diplomacy while preserving central
bank independence for monetary
policy, especially as the trends toward
globally integrated monetary and
financial systems increase. Adding
oversight to the Fed’s diplomatic role
may undermine the Fed’s efficacy as
a monetary policymaker. The task for
democratic accountability of technocratic institutions is therefore a

THE FED’S AGENDA IS ALL
ITS OWN

delicate balancing act.
We recommend, then, not an
overhaul of the Fed’s structure or the
elimination of its role in international
affairs, but the more surgical mandate
of greater disclosure of its international activities. The Fed should
provide testimony to Congress twice
per year on its foreign policies, just as
it does for monetary and regulatory
policy. This kind of disclosure permits
broader discussion of the Fed’s activities without eliminating the benefits
of its institutional independence for
monetary policy.7
Lest this seem like modest reform,
the Fed has fiercely fought even
this level of formalized oversight in
other contexts.8 We therefore take a
moderate position against both the
Fed’s historical positions, which would
exempt most kinds of disclosures of
its diplomacy, and the more searching
congressional interventions that have
been mooted in proposed legislation, such as requiring congressional
pre-approval of the Fed’s regulatory
diplomacy, or prohibiting the central
bank from participating in the forums
where it concludes its international
arrangements without going through
notice and comment rulemaking
before doing so.9

Almost throughout its history, the
Fed has taken domestic factors—not
international ones—into primary
account when conducting monetary
policy. The tendency to allow domestic
interests to direct monetary policy and
indirectly shape the Fed’s interactions
with foreign counterparts runs deep,
back to its founding, where it was
created not only to mimic the Bank
of England, but also to beat it at its
own game of housing the international reserve currency for global trade
and finance. The idea of becoming
an international playmaker for U.S.
interests thus was baked into the Fed’s
institutional DNA.10
This domestic focus becomes a
source of grave frustration both of
central bankers elsewhere, who would
like the Fed to take a more global
perspective, and other U.S. diplomats,
whose jobs become more difficult
when domestic economic interests
spill over into foreign policy.
Take, for instance, the successive
rounds of quantitative easing, introduced in late 2008 in response to the
2008 financial crisis and consequent
recession. Through a series of policy
moves, the Fed began a long-term
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Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the
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set of experiments to combat high
unemployment and the potential
devastation of deflation. International
critics—in China, Brazil, India, and
elsewhere—claimed that the Fed was
engaged in “currency wars,” since these
unconventional policies had the consequence of depreciating the U.S. dollar at the expense of export-oriented
economies.11 Former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke denied that the
intent was to harm emerging-market
countries, but he also disclaimed any
responsibility for considering the economic interests of allies.12 “Financial
regulation and supervision are areas in
which the Fed and other central banks
should cooperate (and to an important
extent already do) to reduce financial risks,” he said. But on monetary
policy the response was different. As
“economic conditions in our respective countries” differed, Bernanke
noted, “our perceived interests began
to diverge.”
As Bernanke noted above, the Fed
has at times acted in a more “cosmopolitan” fashion, with a commitment
to international cooperation, especially
in the areas of bank regulation—
which it oversees in conjunction with
several foreign central banks—and
ensuring global financial stability.
What is remarkable is how much the

Fed controls its foreign policy agenda,
whether it is seeking U.S. domestic
economic priorities or seeking international cooperation.
FINANCIAL STABILITY ABROAD

During the Mexican peso crisis
in the mid-1990s, called by some
the “first crisis of the 21st century,”
many feared that Mexico’s default on
its government debt would not only
wreak havoc on its own economy, but
also affect its major trading partners—
including the United States. The
Clinton Administration wanted to
help Mexico avoid default, and needed
$40 billion to rescue the peso, but the
Administration feared congressional
backlash to using funds Congress
had authorized for arguably different
contexts. The Fed then intervened.
Specifically, the Fed’s Division of
International Finance engineered a
way for Mexico to exchange pesos
for dollars through an “international
swap facility” between the Fed and
the Bank of Mexico.13 Through the
swap facility, Mexico could get access
to dollars exclusively from the Federal
Reserve that it could not secure in the
private markets.
The peso intervention provided a
blueprint for the Fed’s actions during the 2008 global financial crisis.

Although the Fed is most remembered for its “bailouts” of U.S.-based
banks and other financial institutions,
the Fed also stretched its legal authority to provide favored foreign central
banks with the dollar liquidity they
needed to survive. As one scholar
observed, “at the height of the financial crisis, the biggest beneficiaries of
the Federal Reserve’s emergency loans
were not American banks but European ones.”14 The so-called Eurodollar market was also, during the crisis,
faced with a high demand and a small
supply for U.S. dollars, putting all
financial institutions participating in
Eurodollar trades—and there were
many of them—at risk.
In 2008-2010, the Fed became
the world’s banker by supplying U.S.
dollars in exchange for currencies
from over a dozen countries, reflecting the Fed’s belief that crisis response
required internationalism. These transactions are known as currency swaps,
and agreements in place to commit
to a number of currency swaps in
advance are called swap lines.15 Swap
lines both exemplify the Fed’s power,
given the size and importance of these
swaps, and the Fed’s autonomy in
deploying that power. Although Congress has never formally enshrined
these swaps into the language of the
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plan to take as part of international regulatory negotiations,
and provide a public report to Congress on the negotiations at their conclusion.” Staff of H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 114th Cong. Memo on the full committee markup
of the Financial Choice Act of 2016.
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		Congress’s instructions to the Fed do not mention an international mission, though the setting of American monetary
policy has global implications. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (instructing the Fed to set rates “to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”). An

exception to this domestic-first approach was the Fed’s
sometimes unthinking devotion to the gold standard in
the interwar era, where the Fed’s interest-rate decisions
seemed more tailored to protecting the UK’s ability to sustain the international gold standard than it did to protecting
domestic U.S. economic interests.
11
		 James Rickards, Currency Wars: The Making of the Next
Global Crisis (2012).
12		
Bernanke pointed to the empirical evidence suggesting
that such devaluation is offset by the increase in domestic
income, “which in turn raises home demand for foreign
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goods and services.” Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings Institution, Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the IMF: Federal Reserve
Policy in an International Context (Dec. 2015).
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See Edwin Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications
for International Finance, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/bulletin/1996/396lead.pdf.
14		
For an overview, see Stephen A. Fowler, Note, “The Monetary Fifth Column: The Eurodollar Threat to Financial Stability and Economic Sovereignty,” 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 825, 827 (2014).
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Federal Reserve Act, today the swap
lines between the Fed and six foreign central banks have become fully
formalized.
It is worth underscoring how
selective the Fed was, even among
the U.S.’s diplomatic allies. The Fed
entered swaps with Brazil but not
Argentina, Japan but not China, and
Singapore but not Malaysia. This
kind of selective policy was no doubt
motivated in large part by the Fed’s
assessment of counterparty risk and
where dollar liquidity would do the
most good. But the appearance (and
likely substance) of the decision also
reflects the irreducibly political and
diplomatic nature of the Fed’s foreign
relations. Normally, the President,
subject to parameters established in
law by Congress, is in charge of determining which allies get which benefits, whether in trade, military support,
direct aid, or other kinds of benefits.
Here, supporting U.S. allies’ financial
systems—hardly a niche interest from
the perspective of foreign relations—
was left to the Fed alone to determine.
It was not only the fact of these
alliances that draws interesting attention, but the size as well. At one point
the Fed had swapped currencies worth
$583 billion, or one-fourth of the
assets on its books, to its foreign part-

ners.”16 By way of contrast, the entire
foreign development assistance budget
for USAID in 2017 was $22 billion.17

jobs in concert. To this day, the BIS
acts as the committee’s secretariat.19
As with the BIS, the Fed created Basel without congressional
authorization to do so (though that
eventually came later.)20 There is little
evidence that in its secretive early
years the executive branch had much
information at all about the policy
formulation process in Basel. The U.S.
Treasury Secretary still has not had an
opportunity to join the committee or
to participate in its meetings. It was
strictly a central bank affair.21
Bank supervision is not now and
has almost never been the exclusive
purview of central banks, whether in
the United States or abroad.22 But
through the Basel Committee, central
banks negotiated an international
regulatory framework of enormous,
decisive importance to the way that
national governments think about this
basic feature of government-market
interactions.23 Participation in these
international efforts to coordinate
bank supervision also exemplify the
Fed at its most cosmopolitan, as it
has agreed to conduct the rules it
uses to supervise the most important American banks, including their
capital rules, in the manner set by an
international process that it influences,
but does not control. There are few

INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISION
AND REGULATION

After World War I, central banks
seeking financial cooperation organized what they called the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS),
located in neutral Switzerland, as a
kind of bank for central banks, a private organization with a public purpose owned by the central banks and
not their governments.18 Although
the BIS lurched through a controversial turn during World War II—the
BIS probably laundered gold stolen
by Nazis from the regime’s Jewish
victims—the BIS continued to find its
footing as a support institution even
after the establishment of the World
Bank and International Monetary
Fund, sister organizations with overlapping responsibilities. Eventually,
prompted by two medium-sized, but
broadly consequential, international
bank failures in 1974, the Fed, the
other central bank governors of the
G-10, Luxembourg, and Switzerland
established the Basel Committee on
Bank Supervision. This committee
asserted that central banks could best
perform the regulatory parts of their

NOTES
the foreign central bank’s commitment to repurchase its
currency at a set future date for a set price, which means
that it receives back the exact nominal amount of dollars
that it originally swapped. The foreign central bank also
pays an additional fee based on a preset interest rate.
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See Colleen Baker, “The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines,” 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 607 (2013).
17		
McKenna, Long & Aldridge, “History and Mission of USAID,”
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(Aug. 2017).
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See Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Bank for International

Settlements: A Profile of an International Organization 2
(June 1995) (describing the BIS ownership structure).
19
The Basel Committee itself does not have a staff, and barely
has a budget. It is, at best, a kind of institutionalized meeting that makes ample use of the resources of the home
central banks and the coordination function of the BIS.
20		
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3901(b).
21		
The Fed has since been joined by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
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22		

See Elizabeth F. Brown, “Consolidated Financial Regulation:
Six National Case Studies and the Experience of the European Union,” Volcker Alliance Working Paper.
23		
Why Basel became so important has been the subject of
much debate. For an overview, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier,
“The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation,” 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1422 (2013).
24
Victoria McGrane & Ryan Tracy, “Sen. Shelby to Unveil Legislation Heightening Fed Security,” Wall Street Journal (May
11, 2015).
25
		Huw Jones, “Fed’s Quarles to chair Financial Stability
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regulatory questions of more interest
to banks than how much capital they
must maintain, and the Fed’s decision to delegate the answer to that
question to an international process
reflects a foreign policy decision as
much as a financial regulatory one.
Basel’s requirements have been
blamed in some quarters as a contributor to the 2008 financial crisis,
particularly because of its overly
generous treatment of the stability of
housing assets, but the Fed has made
this framework the focus of its crisis
response, even empowering a new and
more politically responsive overseer
for the committee, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB). The FSB
comprises all of the principal financial
regulatory networks, chiefly the Basel
Committee, along with the securities
market and insurance company regulators, the World Bank, and the IMF.
Participation in these international
forums are not unanimously popular
among U.S. politicians, in part because
of a sense in some corners that these
bodies impose international cooperation at the expense of U.S. domestic
interests. In the interest of making
sure that the U.S. can see after its own
economic needs first, members of both
the House and Senate have intro-

duced legislation that would forbid
American financial regulators from
setting regulatory standards through
an international process.24 Despite
this, the Fed has continued to rely on
Basel and the FSB to set the standards for safety and soundness that
it applies to American banks. This
reality was reinforced with the recent
appointment of Fed Governor Randal
Quarles—the Fed’s first ever Vice
Chair for Supervision appointed by
President Trump in 2017—as the new
chair of the FSB.25 Post-crisis financial regulation thus has continued
to be outsourced to an international
process.

REFORMING THE FED’S
REGULATORY DIPLOMACY
What to do about this unusual,
even unique, set of institutional
arrangements at the intersection of
central banking and foreign affairs?
Opening the Federal Reserve Act for
a complete overhaul, as some have
proposed in response to perceived
abuses of authority, is unappealing.26 There is no guarantee that the
resulting central bank would be an
improvement to the existing one, and
a great risk that it would be inferior.

If its independence is one of the Fed’s
most valuable, if frequently misunderstood, political assets, it is difficult to
find ways to obligate it to coordinate
its foreign relations policies with
the legislature or executive without
damaging that asset with respect
to monetary policy. Reforming the
Fed—to improve its accountability in
foreign affairs or in any other aspect of
its institutional design—confronts this
same challenge: how to protect what
is worthwhile about the Fed as an
independent central bank while also
increasing the extent of democratic
accountability that its other activities
require.
Three proposals with historical
precedent can be dismissed outright:
1. Making the Fed’s chief diplomat a Senate-confirmed Presidential
appointee (removable at the President’s will);
2. Increasing the formal, institutionalized congressional oversight
of the Fed, through the Government
Accountability Office (GAO); and
3. Doing nothing.
The first proposal would destroy
the Fed’s independence; there is
nothing inherent in the second that
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engaged in regulatory diplomacy.
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Board of Governors, Financial Stability Report, November
28, 2018, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/financial-stability-report.htm.
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suggests GAO-oversight would lead
to better policy outcomes; and the
third is unappealing on its face. Not
only is the general lack of accountability troubling, but also the consistency of the Fed’s approach to foreign
relations is, as we have shown, by no
means clear. And while a consistent
foreign policy is not a be-all and
end-all, the Fed might serve its own
interests as well as the public interest
if it provided more information about
its international plans than it does
today. Also, in a time of concern about
the deep state, doing nothing about
the Fed’s increasingly controversial
regulatory diplomacy risks furthering
a political backlash against any degree
of agency discretion. These decisions
are inescapably political. Regulatory
diplomacy, with all of its virtues, needs
some kind of external political check
to guide its internal political logic.
For this reason, we endorse a
fourth proposal to address the problem of the Fed’s independent foreign
relations policy: a modest legislative
fix whereby the Fed goes to Congress
twice annually, separate from its twice
annual monetary policy testimony,

to discuss specifically its vision of
international affairs and the Fed’s role
within it. The scope of these hearings
would go beyond the new reporting
requirements mandated by the May
2018 bipartisan banking law.27 For
the most part, these hearings would
be uneventful, even boring. But these
hearings can serve a useful purpose for
democratic accountability by educating members of Congress—and the
public—about exactly how international an institution the Federal
Reserve actually is. And if, as in
today’s climate, the Fed’s internationalism is out-of-step with the political
zeitgeist, a bit of democratic humility
might counsel toward an adjustment
in orientation.
In this way, the Fed’s foreign relations would be subject to enhanced
disclosure, but not other more intrusive forms of legislative action (such as
political audits). It would be a publically beneficial exercise for the Fed to
clarify where it sees its international
relationships. It also would give the
executive and legislative branches
an opportunity to adjust their own
thinking about international economic

6

affairs. More testimony and hearings
amount to low-key reform, but in this
case the more exciting solutions seem
to come with uniquely detrimental
drawbacks. Our disclosure-oriented
approach could, more generally,
inform the way the political branches
treat the other independent agencies.28
The Fed will likely resist such a
proposal, but its recent forays into
greater transparency have nevertheless
been encouraging. In November 2018,
the Fed released the first installments
of two new reports that it intends to
publish regularly: the Financial Stability Report29 and the Supervision
and Regulation Report.30 Current Fed
Chairman Jerome Powell referred to
these documents as “important tools”
for “sharing Federal Reserve views and
stimulating public dialogue regarding
the stability of the financial system.”31
On the subject of the Fed’s foreign
relations, it would be beneficial to the
public for the Fed to continue this
trend toward transparency—with or
without a nudge from Congress.
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